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Descartes posited an immaterial mind to account for much of the psychology 
of human beings. This mind was the sole natural (as opposed to divine) cause of 
all purely intellectual acts, the sole agent in acts of will, the necessary condition 
for conscious or phenomenal sensory and imaginal experience, and the seat of 
the passions proper. Only the first two acts involve the mind alone: sensory 
experience, acts of phenomenal imagination, and the passions require mind–
body interaction (whether interpreted occasionalistically or as true interaction). 
Indeed, sensory perceptions, whether of external objects, internal bodily states, 
or of the sort known as “passions of the soul” (which I’ll call “passions proper” 
or just “passions”) are the passive effect in the mind of bodily activity in the 
nerves and brain fluids (“animal spirits”). They are acts of mind (mental states) 
caused by bodily states. 
To account for the “mental life” of human beings—consciously available 
mental activities or states—Descartes’s scheme required an immaterial mind. 
However, the thesis of this chapter is that Descartes’s theoretical framework 
yielded a further set of psychological processes and states that involve the body 
alone. Such processes and states, which occur without any mental contribution, 
are shared by human and nonhuman animals alike. In Descartes’s view, these 
processes, as produced by brain mechanisms that direct the flow of animal 
spirits, explain much of the behavior of all animals, humans included. 
According to Descartes’s notorious “animal machine” hypothesis, all the 
behavior of nonhuman animals is accounted for by mechanical processes alone. 
These processes, as I interpret Descartes, are devoid of intentionality and 
sentience proper.1 Yet Descartes intended such [50] processes to account for the 
animal capacities and behaviors that, in the Aristotelian scheme, were explained 
by the “sensitive soul,” or the sensitive power of the animal soul. These 
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capacities included not only sense perception, but also the limited motivational 
and cognitive functions that Aristotelians attributed to the sensitive appetites 
and the “estimative power” in animals. The appetites would direct animals 
toward things they perceive as good for them and away from things they 
perceive as bad; the estimative power was to account for simple cognitive acts 
in animals, as when the sheep perceives the wolf to be an enemy (ST I.81.3).2 
Although the Aristotelians ascribed such powers to the soul of nonhuman 
animals, Descartes proclaimed that he could explain such capacities in an 
entirely mechanistic manner—not only in nonhuman animals but for “very 
many” human behaviors that “do not depend in any way on the mind” (AT 
7:229).3 
It is legitimate to speak of a mechanistic psychology in Descartes by analogy 
with the psychology of the Aristotelian sensory soul. The Aristotelian partition 
of vital capacities into vegetative, sensitive, and rational provided a framework 
not only for distinguishing the rational capacities of human animals from the 
limited cognitive capacities of nonhuman animals but also for categorizing their 
shared behavioral capacities. Sensory discrimination, imaginings of objects not 
present, memory of sensory patterns, guidance of motion in a manner 
appropriate to external circumstances and the good of the body, and simple 
cognitive acts belong to the “sensitive soul” or “sensitive power”; they are 
shared by human and nonhuman animals alike. Descartes sought to provide a 
mechanistic account of the capacities within this shared domain of 
psychological phenomena, by contrast with the nonmechanistic hylomorphism 
of standard Aristotelianism. In mechanizing the functions of the sensitive 
power, Descartes effectively mechanized much of the psychology that 
Aristotelians had ascribed to that power. I say “much of” rather than “all,” 
because Descartes did not mechanize conscious sensory perception and the 
passions proper; in his scheme, these require a mind that is acted upon by the 
brain. Nonetheless, Descartes believed that he could account for the sensitive 
soul’s primary functions: those that guide animals (nonhuman and human) in 
behaviors appropriate to their nourishment and health. Aristotelians ascribed 
these functions to the sensitive capacities of the anima or psyche, thereby 
including them within what the seventeenth century sometimes termed 
“psychology.”4 
We will examine the mechanistic psychology of Descartes in the Passions, 
while also drawing on the Treatise on Man. I will develop the idea of a 
Cartesian “psychology” that relies on purely bodily mechanisms [51] by 
showing that he explained some behaviorally appropriate responses through 
bodily mechanisms alone and that he envisioned the tailoring of such responses 
to environmental circumstances through a purely corporeal5 “memory.” An 
animal’s adjustment of behavior as caused by recurring patterns of sensory 
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stimulation falls under the notion of “learning,” behavioristically conceived.6 
Indeed, Descartes’s animal-machine hypothesis may well be a distant ancestor 
to Watsonian behaviorism, via T. H. Huxley (1884). In the final two sections of 
the chapter, I take stock of what psychological capacities Descartes ascribed to 
mind, body, or both, and I also consider those capacities that we might now 
plausibly construe as being explicable by nonmentalistic mechanisms as 
opposed to those that at present remain unreducedly mentalistic. 
The Function or “Use” of the Passions 
In the scholastic Aristotelian scheme of Thomas Aquinas and his followers, 
the “passions” were so called because they were indeed passions: the passive 
response of the sensitive appetite to the situation as presented by sense 
perception. In nonhuman animals, the estimative power assesses as good or bad 
the situation as presented by the senses. The sensory appetite then responds to 
this presentation (ST II-1.22.2), being drawn toward the good and away from 
the bad, where “good” and “bad” mean good or bad for the health of the body. 
In a commonly used example, the sheep’s estimative power assesses the sensory 
perception of a wolf as the presence of a dangerous enemy (ST I.81.3). The 
sensory appetite then responds with the passion of fear (an animal response to a 
present evil, according to Aquinas), inducing the sheep to flee the wolf. In the 
human animal, the “cogitative power” of the sensitive part of the soul plays the 
role of the estimative power in nonhuman animals (ST I.78.4). However, human 
beings also possess intellectual appetites (such as the love of God), and they 
undertake voluntary acts, both of which belong to the rational power and hence 
are distinct from (but may serve to curb or guide) the passions, which belong 
only to the sensitive power (ST I.81.2–3, I.82.5). 
Aquinas’s scheme of the passions—eleven in all (ST II-1.23.4), divided into 
“concupiscible” (merely appetitive) and “irascible” (appetite involving 
arduousness)—was widely adopted in the seventeenth century (King 2002, 
Hatfield 2007c). Descartes knowingly departed from it in various ways (AT 
11:379, a. 68). For present purposes, his most important deviation concerns his 
explanation of the powers the Aristotelians assigned to a sensitive soul, that is, 
perceiving and assessing the situation and inducing an appropriate [52] 
behavioral response. In nonhuman animals, to which Descartes denied a 
“sensitive soul” (AT 11:202), he needed to explain these functions through 
purely mechanistic processes. Descartes envisioned these processes as involving 
tubes and fibers and the flow of fluids within the brain and to the muscles, as I 
explain in the next section. 
Importantly, Descartes viewed similar bodily processes as causing the 
human passions. In his definitional scheme, the human passions are indeed 
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passions: passive responses in the mind to a bodily action (AT 11:328, a. 2). 
Without this mental response, there is no “passion,” properly speaking (AT 
11:347, a. 25). Thus, nonhuman animals do not have passions, although they do 
possess the same or similar physiological processes as occur in the human. 
These physiological processes produce true mental passions in the human case 
alone. However, we need a term for these physiological processes as occurring 
in nonhuman animals (and in the human body considered by itself); let us term 
them “corporeal passions,” so as to distinguish them from mental passions 
proper.7 
Even more importantly, Descartes held that, in both human and nonhuman 
animals, brain processes alone direct the body to flee a dangerous situation such 
as the approach of a dangerous animal. In the human case, this normally 
happens without any mental intervention. Purely material brain processes not 
only cause the mental passion of fear but they also directly cause the fleeing (or 
other appropriate) behavior. This is what happens when the sensory image of an 
“unusual and very frightful” animal (AT 11:356, a. 36), such as an approaching 
bear, is formed in the brain and causes the animal spirits to flow: 
 
just as the course that these spirits take toward the nerves of the heart suffices to 
bestow the movement to the gland by which fear is put in the soul, so too, solely 
in virtue of the fact that certain spirits proceed at the same time toward the nerves 
that serve to stir the legs to flee, they cause another movement of the same gland 
by means of which the soul feels and perceives this flight—which can in this way 
be excited in the body by the disposition of the organs alone and without the soul 
contributing to it. (AT 11:358, a. 38) 
 
In the human case, as described here, the flow of spirits caused by the brain 
image of the frightful animal produces three effects. Some of the spirits flow 
toward the heart, and this very flowing of spirits causes the feeling of fear in the 
soul. Some of them flow toward the nerves that set the legs moving to flee from 
the animal. This same flowing of spirits causes the soul to feel that the person is 
running, an act of proprioception that arises from the state of the brain that 
causes the legs to move. [53] 
Although Descartes mentioned cases in which the passion-causing spirits are 
originally set in motion by a judgment of the soul (e.g., AT 11:375, a. 58), the 
above passage describes the primary case: the body responds first to sensory 
stimulation, and its response causes both the initial behavioral response and the 
passion. In the typical “body first” case, the causal chain is material sensory 
image → brain state → (bodily action of flight & feeling of fear & 
proprioception of flight). The person may choose to alter or cease the body’s 
response, by altering the course of flight or by resisting the tendency to flee. 
Nonetheless, mechanistic processes alone mediate the initial response to the 
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dangerous situation. This means that brain mechanisms must discriminate 
causally between an approaching bear and an approaching person (see next 
section). In Descartes’s “body first” theory of the passions, the type of passion 
that is aroused on a given occasion depends on the type of brain state that 
current sensory stimulation induces.8 
If the passion proper—the mental state—does not serve to initiate a response 
such as fleeing, what is its use or function? What is it good for? Descartes 
explains its function quite clearly, while also again affirming the role of the 
brain in initiating a response: 
 
I note that the objects that move the senses do not excite different passions in us 
because of all the diversities that are in them, but only because of the different 
ways that they can harm or profit us, or else in general be important to us; and 
that the use of the passions consists in this alone, that they dispose the soul to 
will the things nature tells us are useful and to persist in this volition; as also the 
same agitation that usually causes them disposes the body to the movements that 
serve for the execution of those things. [AT 11:372, a. 52] 
 
Again, the relations of causal dependence deserve note. The object does not first 
cause a sensory experience in us, which then causes a feeling of fear, which then 
induces us to run. Rather, the object stimulates the sense organs and the brain, 
thereby causing one or another flow of animal spirits. This flow of spirits differs 
depending on whether the brain responds to the material sensory image as it 
usually does when the object is good for us, bad for us, or simply “important” 
(new or different). This motion of the spirits itself directs the body to respond to 
the good (approaching it), the bad (perhaps fleeing, or fighting), and the 
important (stopping and focusing the senses on it). The same flow also causes 
the passion of fear. The material sensory image also causes a mental sense 
perception of the object, and the feeling of fear attaches to that object. The [54] 
passion then affects the will, (defeasibly) causing it to want to do the thing that 
the body has already started to do. 
The function of the passion is in effect to bring on board the mind (or the 
will) as regards the body-mediated response. The body-mediated responses are 
set up to respond differently to things that are (usually) good for the body, or 
bad, or novel. Since the initial bodily response is purely mechanical, it does not 
involve a cognitive classification of the thing as good, bad, or novel. But the 
bodily mechanism here takes on the office of the estimative power in nonhuman 
animals and of the cogitative power in human animals that the Aristotelian 
scheme describes. The bodily mechanism plays the role of these powers through 
nonmental mechanistic operations. I characterize these operations as Descartes’s 
“mechanistic psychology”: the bodily mechanism must respond differentially to 
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good, bad, or novel situations, and they must do so in the absence of sentience 
and of mental representations of the good, the bad, and the novel. 
Such bodily processes do not stimulate the sensitive appetite of the soul as in 
the Aristotelian scheme, for Descartes has banished the “sensitive soul” from 
human and nonhuman animals alike. In nonhuman animals, these bodily 
operations do not produce a passion proper at all but set in motion a 
physiological process (corporeal passion) that plays the body-preserving role 
that the Aristotelians had assigned to the sensitive soul: causing the body to 
approach the good and flee the bad. In human animals, the bodily processes 
cause a passion proper in the mind, and this passion engages the will and moves 
the mind to affirm and continue the body’s response. 
This does not mean that, for Descartes, bodily processes alone determine all 
human responses to a dangerous animal or all human responses aimed at what is 
good for the body. Descartes held that the will can override the passion-based 
response (AT 11:363–4, a. 46); for example, one might decide to stand 
unmoving rather than to run from a dangerous animal. In such a case, the bodily 
processes would cause a tendency to run and they would also cause the feeling 
of fear; the will could override the running but one would still feel the fear (AT 
11:362–3, a. 45). More generally, through the intellect a human being might 
perceive a dangerous situation in the absence of the processes that create the 
passions and, without ever feeling fear, pursue a course of action to alleviate the 
danger. Or, in another scenario, the intellect might perceive that (bodily-
induced) fear was not a reliable response in a given circumstance and would 
therefore lead the will to ignore comparable responses, or indeed the intellect 
might even induce the will to retrain such responses. To understand the bodily 
responses themselves and the [55] possibility of retraining them, we must enter 
into the details of Descartes’s mechanistic psychology. 
Brain Physiology: Innate and Acquired Responses 
Descartes ascribed great abilities to the mindless human body (described 
counterfactually, without an adjoined mind) and to the mindless bodies of 
nonhuman animals. He surveyed these various capacities in the Treatise (written 
in the early 1630s and first published in the original French in 1664), and he 
summarized this description in Pt. 5 of the Discourse on the Method (AT 6:55–
56). The list of functions is impressive: the reception of material sensory 
images, their imprinting in the corporeal imagination and in corporeal memory, 
and the functioning of these brain mechanisms to guide the behavior of the 
animal machine (in the Treatise and Discourse, a mindless human body). The 
Discourse explains that in the brain corporeal “ideas” (material brain patterns) 
are received in the corporeal “common sense” and preserved in the corporeal 
Mental Acts and Mechanistic Psychology in Descartes’s Passions 
 
51 
“memory.” In the “fantasy” or corporeal imagination, these corporeal ideas can 
be changed and combined to form new brain patterns. The material brain 
patterns in the corporeal imagination (as in the common sense and memory) also 
direct the animal spirits into the nerves that lead to the muscles: 
 
by distributing the animal spirits to the muscles, [the corporeal imagination can] 
make the members of this body move in as many different ways as the members 
of our bodies can move without being guided by the will, and in a manner that is 
just as appropriate to the objects that are presented to the body’s senses and to the 
internal passions that are in the body. [6:55]  
 
The “passions” in this sentence are what I term “corporeal passions.” 
Here Descartes claims that brain mechanism alone can guide the mindless 
human body to situationally appropriate behaviors. The Treatise makes an even 
stronger claim, that the corporeal memory, “without there being any soul in this 
machine, can be disposed naturally to imitate all the movements that real human 
beings, or even other similar machines, will make when the soul is present” (AT 
11:185). That purely corporeal mechanisms, in the absence of a soul or mind, 
can imitate all the movements of normal, ensouled human beings is a bold 
claim. We presumably should treat it as hyperbole, since in the Discourse 
Descartes proposed that mindless machines would not be capable of general 
problem solving or of meaningful speech (AT 6:56–57), to which we may add 
that such machines would not have conscious awareness nor exercise acts of 
will. Even so, Descartes in fact held that many motions of the human body [56] 
“do not depend in any way on the mind,” including basic physiological 
processes such as “heartbeat, digestion, nutrition, respiration when we are 
asleep,” but also “while awake, walking, singing and the like, when they occur 
without the mind attending to them” (AT 7:229–30). Further examples of such 
actions include extending one’s hands when one falls (which, in his view, 
occurs automatically, without mental guidance), or blinking when something 
approaches the eyes rapidly (AT 11:338–9, a. 13). 
Indeed, Descartes held that, beyond explaining such habitual or reflexive 
responses, purely corporeal brain mechanisms could explain a great deal more 
of human (and of nonhuman animal) behavior. In the Treatise and the Passions 
he in effect described a corporeal psychology that guides much human behavior. 
The engine of behavior in the Aristotelian psychology of the sensitive soul was 
constituted by simple cognitive and appetitive responses to things as good or 
bad, along with associatively formed habits. We have seen Descartes assert that 
brain mechanisms by themselves can account for responses to things as good or 
bad, as with the dangerous animal. Further, his discussions of memory in the 
Discourse and Treatise effectively assert that brain mechanisms can explain 
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behavior-altering associative habits (considered apart from purely mental 
habits). Let us consider more closely how he thought this might work. 
Descartes’s mindless human bodies are hydraulic mechanisms fueled by a 
“fire without light” in the heart that causes the blood to grow hot and expand. 
The force of the expanding blood powers the machine. The subtler and more 
forceful particles in the blood proceed through the arteries to the brain, where 
they are distilled out as animal spirits, which flow from the pineal gland toward 
nerve tubules. The gland is located in a central brain cavity, and the walls of the 
cavity are formed by the ends of nerve tubules, some of which are connected to 
the sense organs, and some to muscles. Those connected to sense organs serve 
as sensory nerves, which open in response to material influences on the sense 
organs (such as an image on the retina). As they open, these tubules receive 
spirits that flow along a rectilinear path from the pineal gland. In the case of 
vision, Descartes maintained that the pattern of the retinal image is reproduced 
in the pattern of tubule openings and hence is reproduced on the surface of the 
pineal gland (Hatfield 1992, Beyssade 2003). 
Whether the outflowing spirits are directed by sensory impressions or by a 
material disposition of the pineal gland (or indeed by the mind, in the case of 
voluntary motions), they also enter nerves leading to the muscles, which 
function as motor nerves. These spirits serve as a hydraulic fluid [57] that 
inflates the muscles (which are like impermeable sacks) causing them to 
contract, and, as the pressure decreases, to deflate as they elongate again. 
The projection of the spirits into the motor tubes and the connections of the 
tubes themselves (their “plumbing”) together produce the various movements of 
the machine. Hence, we must consider the factors that influence both the flow of 
the spirits and the plumbing of the brain. 
Descartes lists four factors that control the distribution of the spirits to the 
muscles and thereby control the motion of the machine: sensory stimulation; the 
innate plumbing of the brain; alterations in the plumbing due to previous 
sequences of stimulation; and the character of the spirits themselves (lively or 
sluggish) as sent up from the heart (AT 11:166, 192–3). The last factor can itself 
be influenced by a current physiological state (e.g., the type of food or drink 
ingested) and by humoral temperament (11:166–8). Sensory stimulation 
includes both the external senses, as affected by various environmental 
situations, and the internal senses, as affected by factors such as the amount of 
food in the stomach. 
The remaining two factors are innate and acquired plumbing. Innate 
plumbing must account for many basic responses. The machine grimaces and 
withdraws its hand from the fire because of its innate structure. Further, a 
mindless human body will, by “natural instinct,” pursue “desirable” things and 
avoid “injurious” ones (AT 11:192–3). As the passages from the Passions 
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quoted in Section 1 imply, the brain is set up so that the image of a dangerous 
animal, in reaching the pineal gland, naturally induces a flow of spirits that 
causes the animal to run. The behaviors that result from innate instincts include 
the pursuit of food and drink and the avoidance of many basic dangers. 
Nonetheless, instinct alone cannot fully explain either the behavior of 
nonhuman animals or those human behaviors that occur independently of the 
mind. Descartes granted corporeal memory a large role in explaining such 
behavior (AT 11:185). The purely corporeal memory is an engine of association. 
As the Treatise explains, when corporeal sensory patterns have occurred 
frequently together, then the occurrence of one pattern will cause the other to 
arise in the brain: the sensory pattern of two eyes and a nose will evoke the 
image of a forehead and a mouth, so as to complete the image of a face 
(11:179). Or the corporeal image of fire will result in the corporeal image of 
heat (where “image” is not restricted to vision, but includes the sensory patterns 
that regularly arise in other sense organs in response to environmental stimuli). 
According to Descartes, such purely corporeal associative mechanisms can 
explain various behaviors in human and nonhuman animals in the [58] absence 
of intervening mental activity. He gave an example of mechanistic “learning” in 
a dog: “if you whipped a dog five or six times to the sound of a violin, it would 
begin to cry and run away as soon as it heard that music again” (AT 1:134). 
Although he did not call this change in behavior “learning,” we can 
conveniently use the behavioristic notion of learning to describe the mechanism 
posited by Descartes. On a strict behavioristic conception, “learning” is a stable 
change in behavior as a result of previous sensory stimulation. The behavioristic 
connotation is appropriate here, because Descartes ascribes this mechanism of 
behavior change to nonhuman animals (to whom he denies mental states) and to 
mindless human bodies. 
Descartes frequently mentions that the brain mechanisms of association offer 
us the possibility of training or retraining the passions. The passions themselves 
are produced as bare psychophysiological effects in the mind. As such, they are 
governed by an “institution of nature” (AT 6:139) and hence by Descartes’s rule 
that “any given movement occurring in the part of the brain that immediately 
affects the mind produces just one corresponding sensation” (AT 7:87). 
According to Descartes, there is a one-to-one correspondence between type of 
brain state and type of sensation. Since passions are a type of body-caused 
perception (AT 11:345–8, aa. 22–5), this rule applies to them. 
Nonetheless, Descartes contends that passions that initially are caused by 
one sort of object can become associated with other objects. This can happen 
through early experience. If an infant is badly frightened by a cat, the infant’s 
brain may be so altered that the sensory image of a cat will ever after be 
associated with the brain state that causes fear (AT 11:429, a. 136). Such brain-
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mediated associations might account for a variety of otherwise inexplicable 
psychological tendencies. Descartes describes his own tendency to be drawn to 
cross-eyed women as the consequence of having loved a cross-eyed girl during 
childhood: 
 
the impression made by sight in my brain when I looked at her crossed eyes 
became so closely joined with the impression that was also made by her for 
arousing in me the passion of love that for a long time afterwards when I saw 
anyone with a squint I felt more inclined to love them than to love any others, 
solely because they had that defect; and nevertheless I did not know that it was 
because of that. [5:57] 
 
One brain impression (caused by the girl’s crossed eyes) became associated with 
another brain impression (that which causes a feeling of love). Thereafter, a type 
of object that did not naturally or innately cause a [59] feeling of love (a cross-
eyed person) came to arouse that feeling in him, by means of associative 
connections between brain impressions. 
In the Passions, Descartes explained how we could, by forming new habits, 
alter the connection between a given passion and a specific object. This might 
happen in either of two ways: through brain–brain reassociations, or through 
idea–idea associations. The first mechanism seeks to replace an association 
between a given material impression (e.g., of a cat) and a corporeal passion 
(e.g., that producing fear) with a different association (e.g., connecting cats and 
love). If one were afraid of cats, Descartes would presumably diagnose a 
contingent relation between the brain image of a cat and the corporeal state that 
causes fear. He might advise us to break that material association by replacing it 
with an incompatible one: between the brain image of a cat and the corporeal 
passion that causes a feeling of love. Extending his suggestions in article 45 (AT 
11:362–3), we might do this by, in the presence of cats, thinking about things 
that are associated with love but that are unrelated to fear. We might consider 
that food easily tames cats, that the person we love loves cats, or the like. These 
thoughts induce brain states that are incompatible with the brain state that 
causes fear; because we produce these brain states while we also have the brain 
image of cat, a new association is formed between brain states, yielding a 
mechanism through which we feel love rather than fear in the presence of cats. 
The second mechanism involves establishing a connection between the 
mental feeling of a passion and a subsequent mental state. In article 211 (AT 
11:485–8), Descartes recommends that if we haven’t been able to retrain 
ourselves by reassociating brain states, we should form a mental habit so that 
the will intervenes whenever we feel a certain passion. In response to the 
unhappy consequences of our past states of anger, we might deliberately seek to 
form habits of the will through which, upon feeling the passion of anger, we 
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check any violent behavior and also direct our thoughts toward the unhappy 
results arising from previous actions taken in anger. Descartes did not believe 
we could directly will strong anger away (AT 11:363–4, a. 46), but he did think 
we could stay our action (despite the “appetitive” affect of the passions). Once 
the action is checked, we might then will thoughts of things that would lessen 
the brain-based state of anger—for example, we could think of an object of love 
(e.g., the cat), or about the still waters of a quiet pond.9 [60] 
Descartes’s Two Psychologies: Problems and Open Questions 
In mechanizing the psychology of the Aristotelian sensitive soul, Descartes 
claimed to describe brain mechanisms capable of producing situationally 
appropriate behavior in response to things that were good, bad, or novel. He 
posited innate mechanisms that “naturally” lead an animal to approach good 
things, avoid bad things, and train the sense organs on novel things. He also 
posited corporeal mechanisms of association by which the responses to a given 
thing could be altered, by realigning the connection between types of brain 
states (image of a cat → brain state yielding fear) and replacing them with new 
associations (image of cat → brain state yielding love). In sum, his mechanistic 
psychology purports to explain innate and acquired adaptive (i.e., life 
promoting) responses to stimulus patterns.10 
Descartes of course did not hold that all human psychology can be explained 
in this manner: he excluded rational or intellectual acts, conscious awareness, 
and acts of will. In order to account for such properly “mental” acts, Descartes 
posited a mental substance, that is, an immaterial mind, as their vehicle and 
causal agent. He appealed to an immaterial mind in explaining a portion of 
human psychology: intellectual cognition, mental appetites, phenomenal 
experience, and language use. He also attributed other psychological processes 
or capacities to the mind: in addition to brain-based memory, he posited a purely 
mental memory (e.g., AT 4:114), and he ascribed habits to the mind that do not 
depend on the brain mechanisms of association (e.g., 7:438). 
There are, then, two sorts of human psychological processes, according to 
Descartes: purely corporeal processes that govern much behavior, and mental 
processes that account for certain kinds of cognitive and volitional acts. Some 
psychological functions, such as memory and habit, occur on both sides of the 
mind–body divide. Descartes allowed that various phenomena in the domain of 
“memory” were subject to completely different explanations. He posited both a 
corporeal memory, explained by brain patterns (AT 11:360, a. 42), and purely 
mental habit and memory, depending on the immaterial mind alone (AT 3:48, 
7:438). In human beings, corporeal memory may lead to conscious recollection, 
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as in the recall of past images, but it may also guide behavior without conscious 
upshot (AT 7:229–30). 
Why would Descartes double up his psychological predicates, by tacitly or 
explicitly invoking notions of mental memory and corporeal memory, mental 
passions and corporeal passions, mental habits and bodily [61] associations? He 
did so because of the interaction between two factors: the domain of phenomena 
he wished to explain and the explanatory resources permitted by his 
metaphysics. The domain of phenomena requiring explanation was the behavior 
of human and nonhuman animals alike, including adaptive responses to a 
current situation and stable changes in behavior in response to patterns of 
sensory stimulation. The permitted explanatory framework required that he 
account for the nonhuman animal behavior nonmentalistically. The parallel 
between human and nonhuman physiology, together with his body-first 
conception of observed phenomena such as instinctual eye-blink and immediate 
emotional responsiveness, required that he also explain part of human behavior 
nonmentalistically. His conclusion that consciousness, intellection, and volition 
entail an immaterial substance required that he posit a mind to explain at least 
these human capacities. The phenomena required that certain capacities and 
tendencies, such as memory and habit, had to be acknowledged in both his 
mechanistic psychology of physiological mechanisms and in his mentalistic 
psychology. 
Certain psychological capacities, such as conscious sense perception and the 
passions, depend on mind–body interaction. In his discussions of both the 
passions and the psychology of sense perception, Descartes made original 
contributions on both sides of the mind–body divide: in envisioning brain 
mechanisms (such as those I describe in Section 2), and in describing the 
psychological processes that yield perception of size and distance. In the field of 
perception, his work, including his theory of “natural geometry,” generated 
ongoing theoretical discussion for at least a century after his death (Hatfield 
1990, chap. 2; 1992; 2000). 
We have seen that, leaving interaction aside, Descartes had to allow sensory 
capacities and basic cognitive capacities on both sides of the divide. In 
particular, he had to allow that the functions of the sensitive soul could be 
carried out by material mechanisms in nonhuman animals and mindless human 
bodies alike. If we hew strictly to the notion of mechanistic psychology as 
nonmental and nonintentional, we must then charge Descartes to explain the 
ability of nonhuman animals and mindless human bodies to respond to 
“harmful” and “desirable” things without invoking mental or intentional 
notions.11 
There are two problems here, one psychological, one metaphysical. The 
psychological problem concerns the adequacy of purely corporeal mechanisms 
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for explaining the simple cognitive functions that Descartes acknowledged 
among the phenomena that had previously been explained by the sensitive soul. 
He must now account for these phenomena without invoking the sensitive soul’s 
capacity for perception and discrimination. I [62] believe that Descartes invoked 
pattern-matching brain mechanisms here, explicating them through patterns of 
tubule openings or of pineal outflow. These mechanisms would be 
supplemented by further brain structures to account for the “natural instincts” of 
the animal machine to respond adaptively to the patterns. Descartes theorized 
that his machines are so constructed that they often or usually avoid what is in 
fact harmful to them and obtain what is good for them. It is an open question in 
Cartesian studies whether these innate instincts are owing to God (through 
special creation) or are due to nature (through a process in which living things 
arise out of a primal chaos).12 
The metaphysical problem concerns the status of “good” and “bad” in 
relation to unensouled animal bodies, human or nonhuman. Descartes raised this 
question in the Sixth Meditation, in comparing the human body in any unhealthy 
state (and without considering its relation to the mind) to a poorly functioning 
clock. The unhealthy state is one that induces the body to drink even when it is 
ill with dropsy (so that drink is bad for it). He compares this poor functioning 
(physiological tendency to drink) with a clock that functions poorly by not 
displaying the proper time. Notoriously, he then suggests that the good and bad 
functioning of the clock or the human body are merely “extraneous” notions that 
our thought imposes on those things rather than having reality “in the things 
themselves.” By contrast, he allows that when the body causes the mind to want 
a drink in these circumstances, this makes for a true error “in the things 
themselves” (AT 7:84–5). 
A natural way to read this passage is to suppose that, among natural (as 
opposed to divine) beings, only the human mind can sustain genuine notions of 
good and bad. The human mind discerns good and bad behavior relative to 
bodily preservation (and relative to moral standards). So interpreted, the passage 
implies that nothing is good or bad relative to the body by itself; the end of 
preserving the body and the notions of what is “good” and “bad” for the body 
depend on the mind’s existence. Of course, Descartes might be able to ground 
the good and the bad for bodies in the extraneous but real intentions of a 
designer, just as he grounds good and bad functioning of a clock in the 
extraneous but real intentions of the clockmaker. But, as is well known, he 
precludes our considering God’s final causes in natural philosophy (AT 7:55), 
and he also precludes such speculation with respect to the apparent design found 
in plants and animals (AT 7:374–5). 
These passages from the Meditations do not match Descartes’s intellectual 
practice in other contexts, for he regularly invokes the “uses” or “functions” of 
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the parts of animals in a way that seems to ascribe [63] biofunctional teleology 
to their constitution (AT 11:224, 227, 238). Thus, he suggests that a mindless 
human body with an empty stomach will rove about until it finds food, and that 
such a body will seek things “desirable” for it (AT 11:193–5). But since it is 
mindless, it feels no desire, so in what sense is the food desirable? In the sense 
(which Descartes frequently invokes) that it is beneficial for the body (AT 
11:372, a. 52; 11:519). 
One might suggest that, in the case of purely corporeal functions, Descartes 
invoked the notions of benefit and proper functioning as merely extraneous 
labels that the theoretical practices of the science of physiology (and of 
mechanistic psychology) suggest to our thought but that have no reality in 
things. This conception would be consistent with the Sixth Meditation and with 
the usual implications of a “mechanistic” world view, that it excludes “final 
causes” from nature (Henry 1997, 57; Shapin 1996, 29–38). 
I would like to offer a different interpretation, which relies on the 
metaphysical notion of “good” in Descartes. In an Augustinian and Platonic 
mode, Descartes (AT 4:354, 7:55) treats the good as what is perfect (complete); 
the bad or evil is what deviates from such perfection (completeness). This 
notion of relative perfection, or completeness, must surely be in play in the 
Sixth Meditation passage: the error of the mind in wanting to drink concerns 
what will harm the body when it is edematous, or reduce its perfection. Now, 
putting aside the theodical question of whether God, as creator, can be blamed 
for the errant thirst (the question that frames the discussion of the Sixth 
Meditation), perhaps we can retain the notion of perfection or completeness in 
human and nonhuman animal bodies in relation to their own growth and 
survival. By “retain” I mean retain as real for the purposes of natural 
philosophy. 
In the Passions, Descartes returns to the clock metaphor and uses it to define 
death. In article 6, he writes: 
 
death never occurs through the fault of the soul, but only because one of the 
principal parts of the body becomes corrupt; and let us judge that the body of a 
living man differs from that of a dead man as much as does a watch or other 
automaton (that is, other self-moving machine), when it is wound and contains 
within it the corporeal principle of the movements for which it is constructed 
together with everything that is required for the action of that principle, and the 
same watch or other machine when it is broken and the principle of its movement 
ceases to act. [AT 11:331–2] 
 
He goes on to explain that the “corporeal principle” of movement of the human 
body derives from the heat of the heart, which causes the blood to expand and 
exit the heart with great force (AT 11:33, aa. 8–9). But note that in the quoted 
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passage he also speaks of “everything that is required” [64] for the action of a 
machine’s corporeal principle, which must include the orderly disposition of its 
parts. And note further that the soul leaves the body when some bodily part 
“becomes corrupt,” that is, loses its proper disposition or functioning. 
Presumably, the soul leaves not because of some merely nominal or 
extraneously considered state of the body, but because the body really is broken. 
(Otherwise, death becomes a merely extraneous label!) 
On this interpretation, the perfection of an organic body consists in its proper 
organization to carry out the functions of life, which for Descartes included the 
usual list of nourishment, growth, and sensory and motor functions (AT 11:201–
2). Accordingly, Descartes could define the benefit and harm that animals 
pursue by natural instinct in terms that are relative to the real perfection of the 
body: whatever promotes growth, nutrition, and proper functioning. Descartes 
of course cannot rely on the telos of an animating psyche to ground this notion 
of perfection, as might an Aristotelian. The problem of integrating the notion of 
proper function into his metaphysics remains an open problem of Cartesian 
metaphysics. But, we must ask, are we any better off today? 
Descartes’s Two Psychologies: Current Status 
One advance in our knowledge since Descartes’s day is Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection. By providing a way of understanding how intricate organisms 
composed of well-ordered parts might arise from the original chaos, natural 
selection gives new life to the notions of function and adaptation. 
For the past hundred years, the notion of biofunctional organization has 
served as the background for much of psychology, including both behaviorism 
and cognitivism. Whether behaviorists emphasized instinct, as did Watson 
(1914, 1919), or learning, as did the later Watson (1930, 17) and Skinner 
(1938), they invoked a notion of biological adaptation and function. They saw 
the organism as adapted and adjusted to its environment (Skinner 1938, 440), 
even if they were primarily interested in learned adjustments. Even opponents of 
nativists must allow that initial sensory and motor capacities and the 
mechanisms of conditioning are part of an organism’s biological equipment. If 
we regard Descartes’s mechanistic psychology as a form of protobehaviorism, 
we ought to allow that Darwin’s theory has advanced the state of discussion on 
the metaphysics of the functions of the animal machine. 
Behaviorist theories, however, are notoriously incomplete in relation to the 
full domain of psychological phenomena, including perception and [65] 
cognition. Today’s theorists (in psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science) 
freely invoke mentalistic notions such as conscious experience and 
representational content. At the same time, most theorists regard the unreduced 
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mentalism in Descartes, which took the form of mind–body substance dualism, 
as undesirable. How far have we come in accounting for the mental by purely 
material processes? If we consider the general state of play in philosophy of 
psychology today, the answer is at best mixed. As regards consciousness, there 
is no actual reduction at present, nor is the road toward reduction visible before 
us. The same might be said for normative aspects of the mental, such as 
judgment and knowledge (Hatfield 1990, chap. 7). 
By contrast, some contemporary theorists see great hope for reduction of the 
propositional or intentional contents of thought.13 This hope is largely inspired 
by Dretske’s informational account of propositional content.14 In Dretske’s 
account, information exists in the world as a physical entity, independent of 
minds. This information is conceived propositionally: it is information that p.15 
In the terms of one popular example, the (say) thirty rings in the cross-section of 
a given tree bear the information that the tree is thirty years old. They do so 
independently of whether anyone understands the relation between tree-rings 
and years.16 
Dretske and his followers use this notion of information, together with the 
concept of biological function, to develop an account of mental representation. 
The details need not detain us. The important point here is that the content of 
such mental representations derives from informational content. The most 
promising avenue for naturalizing intentionality (by many lights) rests on the 
notion that informational content is a mind-independent property of matter or a 
physical relation of some sort. 
Have Darwin and Dretske brought us to the point that we now possess 
acceptable physical accounts of proper functioning and mental content? It seems 
to me not. When the notion of information is ascribed mind-independent 
propositional content, that strikes me as a mentalizing of the physical, rather 
than a reduction of mental content to something mind-independent and physical. 
While not everyone would agree, we can all agree that the question of our 
having adequately reduced even propositional content to something physical 
remains open. 
Further, the question of whether the metaphysics of genuinely functional 
notions, including the normative notions of function and dysfunction, has been 
secured through Darwinian theory also remains open. Some, following Wright 
(1973), believe that Darwinian natural selection sustains notions of 
bioteleological function. Others disagree: they render the notion of function as a 
matter of functional analysis or explanatory schema17 and make it “interest 
relative” what functions there [66] are, thereby returning the notion of well 
functioning to the status of an “extraneous label.” The metaphysics of 
biofunctional teleology remains unsettled.18 
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Descartes’s body of work is ancestral to both of the major traditions in 
recent psychology, behavioristic and mentalistic. He described a mechanistic 
psychology in remarkable detail, seeking to account for memory, learning, and 
situationally appropriate behavior through bodily mechanisms alone. As is 
better known, he contributed to the psychology of perception, including its 
mentalistic aspects, in his work on vision, and he identified the domain of 
conscious phenomena as an explanandum. His work also raised questions 
regarding the metaphysical basis of biological functions that remained open in 
his time and remain open still. Although he believed he had solved other 
metaphysical problems concerning the ontological status of mental phenomena, 
subsequent philosophy has not accepted his solutions. That his work raised 
questions that remain unresolved and that it gave some answers that did not 
stand up, testify to both the astuteness and the difficulty of the questions he 
posed. 
                                                 
1 Some scholars, including Cottingham (1998), Gaukroger (1995, 278–90), Morris 
(2000), and Sutton (2000), interpret Descartes as affirming that nonhuman animals don’t 
have immaterial souls and reflective consciousness while nonetheless ascribing 
properties of sentience or intentionality to their bodily processes. In this paper I interpret 
Descartes’s “animal machine” hypothesis as denying sentience and intentionality to 
nonhuman animals (on which, see Hatfield 2007a). 
2I cite the text and translation of Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae (1964–81), using 
the abbreviation “ST” and the divisions of the work (Part, Question, and Article). The 
Summa was published in manuscript form during the latter part of the thirteenth century. 
3 I cite Descartes’s works using the pagination of the Adam and Tannery edition 
(Descartes 1974–76), abbreviated as “AT,” followed by volume and page numbers. In 
citing his Passions of the Soul I also [67] give the article number. I am responsible for all 
translations of Descartes’s writings herein. 
4 As is well known, Aristotelian “psychology” was founded upon the De anima—the 
Latin title for Aristotle’s Greek work, Peri psyches. This Aristotelian work—or the term 
for its object, the soul or psyche—provided the root word for the term “psychology,” the 
first known uses of which in print date from the sixteenth century (Lapointe 1972). This 
early psychology (usually labeled in Latin simply as the study of the anima) formally 
included study of the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers of the soul, all three, 
although textbook accounts devoted most discussion to the sensitive and rational powers 
and so were in that way similar to the subsequent eighteenth-century use of the term 
“psychology” to denote the discipline that examines the sensitive, motor, and rational 
powers of the soul (Hatfield 1995). Indeed, from the seventeenth century and into the 
eighteenth, subscription to the Aristotelian notion that the soul is responsible for merely 
vital (“vegetative”) functions was in steep decline. This decline is reflected in Christian 
Wolff’s use of the term “psychology” in its narrower sense (sensory, motor, and 
cognitive) in his textbooks, Psychologia rationalis (1740) and Psychologia empirica 
(1738), and in the explicit distinction made by the Wolffian follower Michael Christoph 
Hanov (1766) between a science of the soul and a science of biologia (his term for the 
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study of living things), making his the first known use in print of a cognate for the term 
“biology.” 
5 The implications of a process being purely “corporeal” are different in the Aristotelian 
and Cartesian frameworks. In the Aristotelian framework, the functions of the vegetative 
and sensitive soul are “corporeal”: they are functions carried out by bodily organs as 
hylomorphically “informed” by the anima or psyche (Ariew and Gabbey 1998, 427; 
Hatfield 1998, 956). Here, “corporeal” does not imply “mechanistic.” By contrast, for 
Descartes “corporeal” implies material, which implies a substance possessing only the 
properties of size, shape, position, and motion (and hence not possessed of any telos such 
as animates all hylomorphically conceived substances). Therefore, in the appropriate 
seventeenth-century sense of a “mechanical philosophy,” corporeal implies mechanistic. 
However, equating these two notions is not without philosophical problems, for a 
“mechanism” may imply an organization to perform a function (on which, see Hatfield 
[1992] and Section 3, [68] below). Finally, I should note that in this paper I, as do 
scholars of the seventeenth-century generally, interpret Aristotelian philosophy as it was 
(variously) presented and understood in Descartes’ day. This may differ from our current 
best understanding of Aristotle’s own works; indeed, there is controversy over how best 
to interpret Aristotle’s hylomorphism, conception of matter, and version of the mind–
body problem (e.g., Burnyeat 1992, Nussbaum and Putnam 1992). In this paper, I cite 
Aquinas (13th c.) as a generic Aristotelian account of the functions of the anima or 
psyche (see Hatfield 1998 on various early seventeenth-century Aristotelian accounts of 
sensory perception and their metaphysics). 
6 Here and throughout I use the term “behavior” with the usual behavioristic 
connotations. So understood, not all bodily motions count as behavior: e.g., downward 
motion during free fall is not a behavior, nor is the motion of a sleeping child’s body as it 
is carried in to bed. The behaviorists provided various definitions of behavior, all 
emphasizing that behavior is an action or a “doing” of the organism as it interacts with its 
environment (e.g., Hull 1943, 19; Skinner 1938, 6); the term “action” here does not 
imply any underlying intentionality but it typically does imply that changes in behavior 
should be adaptive (on the notion “adaptive” as invoked here, see note 10). Behavioristic 
notions of learning are sometimes couched in terms of alterations of connections between 
“effectors” and “receptors,” that is, responses and stimuli (e.g., Hull 1943, 69); the more 
abstract description I give in the text accommodates the wider range of behavioral 
learning theories (Estes 1959, 396). 
7 By viewing these physiological processes as “corporeal passions” we can interpret 
Descartes’s occasional mention of “passions” in nonhuman animals (e.g., AT 4:353–4) 
and in the mindless human body (AT 6:55, 11:202) and the human body itself considered 
independently of mental activity (AT 3:373). This interpretation avoids ascribing the 
incoherence that Marjorie Grene (1985, chap. 2) finds in Descartes’s theory. [69] 
8 In this regard, Descartes’s theory of the passions is similar to William James’s (1890) 
later theory of the emotions. However, although both theories are “body first,” they differ 
fundamentally because Descartes assigns a cognitive or “appraisal” value to the mental 
passion proper, whereas James does not (Hatfield 2007b). 
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9 Some scholars, including Voss (1989, viii), Rodis-Lewis (1989, xx–xxi), and Shapiro 
(2003, 42), maintain that Descartes adopted a principle of “habituation,” according to 
which the immediate relations between brain states and felt passions can be altered and 
realigned. My interpretation instead sees any such realignments as mediated by brain–
brain or idea–idea reassociations (see Hatfield 2007c for a detailed assessment of the 
textual evidence). 
10 Descartes spoke of the “preservation” (conservatio) of the “healthy man” (AT 7:87) 
and of bodily actions that tend toward the “benefit” (commodus, profiter) or “harm” 
(nuire) of the animal body (AT 11:372, a. 52; 11:519). The idea that animals tend toward 
their own preservation, and are functionally adapted to do so, is a commonplace of 
biological thinking from antiquity. The notion of “function” employed here is that of 
biological function, which since Aristotle had also been discussed under the concept of 
the “uses” of the parts of an organism or their contribution toward organic ends. The 
modifier “adaptive” (in text) means “adapted to fit the circumstances,” whether standing 
circumstances (as in the instinctual eye-blink, AT 11:338–9, a. 13) or contingent 
circumstances (as when an empty-stomached body roves about prepared to detect and 
grasp food, AT 11:194–5). On Descartes’ conception of physiology, see Hatfield (1992).  
On the pre-Darwinian history of notions of function and adaptedness, see Russell (1916, 
chaps. 1–13) and Rudwick (1985, chap. 3). On the notion of biological function as used 
by Descartes in his Passions, see the excellent paper by Radner (2003), [70] who (in my 
view, mistakenly) denies that Descartes employed a notion of adaptation or adaptedness 
(2003, 175). 
11 I have described Descartes’s mechanistic psychology without importing notions such 
as “representation” or “signification” to describe the relation between brain images and 
external objects. This accords with the language of the Treatise, where Descartes speaks 
of the “correspondence” between brain states and properties of external objects, such as 
their distance from the observer (AT 11:183). We might elaborate Descartes’ mechanistic 
psychology in the language of biofunctional behaviorism, excluding mental terms such as 
“representation.” But in the Passions, Descartes speaks of brain images as “representing” 
external objects (AT 11:356, a. 35). Did Descartes, like the scholastic Aristotelians, 
believe that there is mind-independent intentionality, or representation? For instance, do 
brain images (considered as material patterns) naturally represent objects as being a 
certain way (e.g., representing object’s shapes by resembling them in shape)? Are some 
events that are causally correlated also natural instances of “reference”? Or shall we 
understand these representational relations as depending ultimately on the way in which 
the mind interprets signs and images, so that, for Descartes, the intentionality is derived 
only from mind? Arguments can be made on both sides, and the issue deserves further 
study. 
12 Although Descartes often affirms that animal machines (and machines “like” the 
human body) are created by God (AT 7:384, 11:120), he also suggests on several 
occasions that the world and all the bodies in it developed out of a primal chaos (AT 
8A:100, 11:31–72), simply as a result of impacts among particles. He explained the 
formation of the planets in this way (AT 8A:195) and of the Earth’s geological features 
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(AT 8A:203–31), and he even hinted that plants and animals might arise from “seeds” 
naturally arising out of the chaos (AT 8A:100). On this topic, see Hatfield 2007a. 
13Rey 1997, 6–10. 
14Dretske 1981, 1988, 1995. 
15Dretske 1981, chap. 3. [71] 
16Dretske 1988, 55; Tye 1995, 100. 
17Cummins 1975. 
18Ariew, Cummins, and Perlman 2002. 
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